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Introduction 
The degrading environment is one of the major discussions of our time. The 
environmental challenges include acid rains, air pollution, global warming, hazardous 
waste disposal, ozone depletion, smog, water pollution, overpopulation, rainforest 
destruction, poverty, and soil erosion. The most affected areas include land, forests, 
water, the ozone layer, people and the biodiversity. It is because of these challenges that 
climate change is one of the famous discourses of our time. 
The main argument in this paper is that the degrading environment, as we know it 
today, is a consequence of the discourse of modernity. The study, however, creates 
optimism in the environmental rehabilitating processes because as discourses are 
constructs, instead of constructing destructively, we can construct constructively. In this 
paper, I begin with the presentation of some re-appraisals on the environmental 
degradation state. In another section, I present the environmental degradation question 
as an anthropocentric issue. In a rather long section, I present the environmental 
degradation as a function of the discourse of modernity. In a final section, I present my 
own reflection about the environment, beginning from my personal experience to what I 
think could be done. 
Environmental degradation: Some reappraisals 
The degrading environment has caused a number of intellectual debates seeking to 
assess the impact of human activity on the environment. Characteristic of these debates 
is the fact that they predicted the impending disaster of a shrinking planet, particularly 
in the sixties. People like Aldo Leopold, for example, were already involved in the 
discussions about the environmental sanity. The major concern was sensitizing, 
blaming, warning, and urging people to open their eyes to the ecological crisis. 
In 1962, Rachel Carson with her Silent Spring, inspired widespread public concerns 
with pesticides and pollution of the environment; the study documented detrimental 
effects of pesticides on the environment, particularly on birds. This is a publication that 
facilitated the banning of the DDT pesticide in 1972 in the United States of America. 
Hardin (1968), with his Tragedy of the Commons, argued for mutual coercion and 
relinquishing of the freedom to gave birth because the unrestricted population growth 
would lead to resource overuse. This is the reason why he argued against food aid to the 
developing countries so that these countries may consequently be compelled to reduce 
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their growing populations (Hardin 1994). Another study by Ehrlich et al. (1968), The 
Population Bomb, highlights the fundamental issue of the earth’s finite capacity to 
sustain human civilisation (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2009:63). Both Hardin (1968) and 
Ehrlich et al. (1968) are strongly influenced by the Malthusian theory that states that 
population increases in a geometrical ration, whereas food supply increases in an 
arithmetic ratio. For this matter, then, there would be widespread poverty and starvation, 
which would only be checked by natural occurrences such as diseases, high infant 
mortality, famine, war or moral constraint. 
The Limits of Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) argued that we cannot grow forever. 
With a computer model that analysed global resource consumption and production, they 
showed a global trend on resource use beyond the carrying capacity of the planet. 
… continued growth in global economy would lead to planetary limits being exceeded … 
resulting in the collapse of the population and economic system. … collapse could be 
avoided with a combination of early changes in behaviour, policy and technology (Turner 
2008:1-2). 
Already Adam Smith, in his The Wealth of Nations, recognised the limits to growth, 
predicting that in the long run the population growth would push wages down; natural 
resources would become increasingly scarce, and; the division of labour would 
approach the limits of effectiveness. Linked to this issue of growth limits is the 
discussion about the steady state economy. This concept of a steady state economy 
derives much from the 19th century John Stuart Mill who anticipated the transition from 
economic growth to a stationary state: 
...the increase of wealth is not boundless. The end of growth leads to a stationary state. The 
stationary state of capital and wealth… would be a very considerable improvement on our 
present condition. … 
...a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human 
improvement. There would be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and 
moral and social progress; as much room for improving the art of living, and much more 
likelihood of it being improved, when minds ceased to be engrossed by the art of getting on. 
(Mill 1848)  
According to Daly (2008:1), a stable state economy is a “system that permits 
qualitative development but not aggregate quantitative growth”. In an earlier work, Daly 
(1997) presents the most distinctive traits of a steady state economy is that it undergoes 
neither growth nor recession; it has constant populations of people, stocks of capital, 
and a constant rate of “throughput”, that is, energy and materials used to produce goods 
and services. Daly (2008:2) writes: 
Regardless of whether it will be hard or easy we have to attempt a stable state economy 
because we cannot continue growing, and in fact so-called “economic” growth already has 
become uneconomic. The growth economy is failing. In other words, the quantitative 
expansion of the economic subsystem increases environmental and social costs faster than 
production benefits, making us poorer not richer, at least in high consumption countries. 
These few re-appraisals, picked as examples among many, created an increased 
awareness for environmental degradation and concern about resource scarcity and 
population growth. Such a realisation of ecological imbalance was formulated in a 
vision for collective action by launching a global partnership to improve the human 
environment. The vision laid the foundation for the UN Stockholm Conference of 1972 
on the Human Environment. It was the beginning of the international debate on the 
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environment. This conference was responsible for development of the international law 
and discussion of serious international co-operation on environmental issues. The 
international community was inspired further with the environmental concerns by Our 
Common Future (WCED, 1984), popularly known as the Brundtland Commission. In 
this report, the concept of sustainable development was explicitly pronounced and 
defined as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the 
future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987:43). 
Environmental degradation: Anthropocentric question  
At the core of the environmental degradation is anthropocentrism. In this paper, 
anthropocentrism is looked at from the perspectives of 1) unequal interactions between 
humans and humans and humans and other species; 2) expansion of agricultural 
techniques; 3) Western expansionism, and 4) human self-actualisation in capitalism and 
Marxism. 
One of the major cause for the environmental challenges has been the unequal 
interaction of human beings among themselves, on the one hand, and their unequal 
interaction with other species for survival, on the other. These different interactions 
have led to the destructiveness of humans on the environment for quite some time. 
Beinart (2000:270), tracing the destructiveness, has argued that the earth-shattering 
environmental consequences have been due to European expansion over the last 500 
years. Eurasian disease and immunities, together with the technology gap and ruthless 
conquest, facilitated the devastating depopulation of the Americas, and their re-
population by invaders – human, animal and plant. The taming of nature and the 
indigenous peoples emerges as the central motif. It is in this expansionism that there is 
explanation of the recent African environmental history in the line of the coloniser and 
the colonised. The environmental consequences of colonial incursions (including the 
appropriation of natural resources such as wildlife, forests, minerals, and land), the 
environmental regulations geared to perpetuate resource exploitation, and the 
inadequacy of colonial science has had disastrous effects on the African environment 
(Beinart, 2000:271-275). It is in this line that Murphy (2009) argues that the current 
environmental challenges are a function of the logic of imperialism expressed, for 
example, through colonialism. 
According to Barbour (1978), archeological-fossil evidence shows that trouble might 
have begun ten thousand years ago when new agricultural techniques developed in the 
Ancient Near East and parts of Asia. A move from a nomadic hunter-gathering culture 
to a settled agricultural society marked the first large-scale permanent human effects on 
the natural environment. This ancient agricultural revolution spread between 8000-6000 
BC. Sale (2006) in his After Eden: The Evolution of Human Domination, argues that 
historically it is humans who have destroyed the ecosystem. Richardson (2007:60) 
reviewing and paraphrasing Sale writes:  
… the theme of Kirkpatrick Sale’s After Eden: The Evolution of Human Domination lies not 
in the glorification of the species but in its condemnation: Modern humans ... have left not 
one ecosystem on … earth free of their domination. They have transformed more than half of 
the land on the planet for their own use.” They have consumed a vast array of plant, animal, 
and mineral resources often to depletion … and they have no regard to their sustainability  
Expansionism, together with the idea of progress that have led to an outstanding 
global environmental degradation. Under this idea of progress, the elements of 
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conviction of the nobility and superiority of western civilisation, the canonisation of 
economic and technological growth, belief in reason, and the intrinsic importance and 
ineffaceable worth of life on this earth are key tenets (Nisbet, 1980:317). Christianity, 
which has been taken as an element of civilization in the modern times in contrast with 
traditional spiritualities or religions, tried to give as a moral dimension to history a 
cumulative experience for humanity towards eternal life through knowledge, reason, 
technology, arts, and economy, in a way of making progress some kind of secularization 
of the Christian eschatology (Gare 1995:4). With the critical ecological crisis stemming 
from expansionism and progress, an inference can be made: What has been paramount 
has been the exploitation of the environment for homocentric purposes, actions that 
have fundamentally resulted in continuous environmental degradation processes.  
Marxist thought displays an outstanding critique of the capitalist social system 
arising from the Industrial Revolution that has been the cause of much environmental 
misuse. The criticism is based on the contention that just as production founded on 
capital creates universal industriousness, it also creates a system of general exploitation 
of natural and human qualities. Zimmerman (1996:61) when talking of deep ecology 
asserts that Marxism shares the elements of anthropocentric humanism with capitalism, 
despite the purported position of being radically opposed to capitalism. This is simply 
because Marxism, as capitalism, promotes a wholly instrumentalist attitude towards 
nature. Mar’s claim is that communist revolution would dismantle the class structure 
and technology should control many natural processes. Thus, regardless of the diametric 
opposition positions between Marxism and capitalism, they both share the belief that 
human beings can and should use science, technology and industry to master nature for 
material interests. In a word, the ideal for both Marxism and capitalism of the self-
actualisation of humanity’s potential can hardly be reconciled with the deep ecology’s 
ideal of self-realisation for all beings. Thus, both Marxism and capitalism are 
responsible for an anthropocentrism which has been systematically laid down 
historically to produce modern exploitative science and technology; the latter have 
systematically shaped humans attitude toward the environment. 
 Anthropocentrism becomes a serious environmental challenge because nature is 
seen along the lines of serving human beings. Actually, it is as if human beings are not 
part of nature, and if they are part of it they are above it. It is no wonder, then, that even 
the 1972 conference in Stockholm was called: UN Conference on the Human 
Environment, rather than UN Conference on the Environment or Nature, for example. 
Anthropocentrism is, still, found in Brundtland’s foreword to Our Common Future 
(WCED, 1987:xi): 
… when the terms of reference of our Commission were originally being discussed in 1982, 
there were those who wanted its considerations to be limited to environmental issues only. 
This would have been a grave mistake. The environment does not exist as a sphere separate 
from human actions, ambitions and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human 
concerns have given the very word “environment” a connotation of naivety in some political 
circles. 
The operating understanding of the environmental and human development is 
human-centred: The human being is understood as being apart from nature and whose 
development should only be the focus. The rest of nature should serve the human being. 
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Environmental degradation: Discourse of modernity 
This section presents the idea that the environmental degradation is a function of the 
discourse of modernity. Let me begin by clarifying the concept of discourse. Discourse 
refers to the regimes of truth and general politics of truth of each society (Foucault 
1979). Thus, it is “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities" (Hajer 1995:60). This understanding 
of discourse, however, has two important dimensions. The first dimension is about the 
“frame/macrothought”: Specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations 
(regimens of truth and its politics). The second dimension has to do with 
“practices/behaviour and decision-making” in which the frames are produced, 
reproduced and transformed. 
Three notes on discourses, however, are important from the perspective of Tennekes 
(ny:1-2), with regard to this study. The first note is that there is not only a single 
discourse for any given social issue. This implies that for any single reality there are 
possibilities of having multiple discourses has many frames. The second note is that 
discourses produce practices. This implies that discourses are productive and lead 
people to action. The third note is that discourses change because they are being 
contested and amended continuously. This implies evolution of the frames. This third 
note is of particular relevance in this study because, as we shall see, the discourses 
holding sustaining the traditional ecosophy are gone to give way to discourses 
sustaining modernity. 
Modernity frame: Sapere aude 
Boyne and Rattansi (1990) characterise modernity as having to do with transformation 
for a much better life, destroyer of traditions, and source of unities. Modernity is: 
a maelstrom that promises adventure, joy and growth, transformation of ourselves and the 
world, but also threatens to destroy cherished traditions and securities; it unites by cutting 
across class, region and ideology and yet disintegrates through incessant change, 
contradiction and ambiguity… (Boyne and Rattansi, 1990:6) 
According to Giddens (1990:1), modernity  
refers to modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the 
seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in 
their influence.  
Modernity, as the word goes, does not refer to embracing of the new for its own sake, 
but the presumption of wholesale reflexivity, including reflection on the nature of 
reflection itself: 
Inherent in the idea of modernity is a contrast with tradition. .... The routinisation of daily 
life has no intrinsic connections with the past at all, save in so far as “what was done before” 
happens to coincide with what can be defended in a principled way in the light of incoming 
knowledge. To sanction a practice because it is traditional will not do; tradition can be 
justified, but only in the light of knowledge which is not itself authenticated by tradition. ... 
this means that, even in the most modernised of modern societies, tradition continues to play 
a role. But ... justified tradition is tradition in sham clothing and receives its identity only 
from the reflexivity of the modern (Giddens, 1990: 36-38) 
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Accordingly, therefore, the focal point for a comprehensive excursus on modernity is 
reason. Its high point in the history of western ideas was the epoch following the Middle 
Ages in Europe, the period of “enlightenment”: The age of the glorification of reason. 
“The motto of enlightenment is therefore sapere aude! Have courage to use your own 
understanding!” (Kant 1971:54), Kant said this referring to a mature person, that is, an 
enlightened person. Modernity assumes a universalizing and totalizing character. This is 
the reason why modernity opposes itself to other traditions anterior to it and to other 
cultures. It confronts the geographic and symbolic diversity of other cultures. It 
“imposes itself throughout the world as a homogeneous unity, irradiating from the 
occident” (Baudrillard, 1987:63).  
With the gradual process of the traditional order collapsing, modernity attracts 
people to the possibilities of self-determination and self-construction (Matanle 2011), 
and still the same people “actively and reflexively attempt to reconstruct and control 
their social world in the light of rationally revealed but permanently provisional 
knowledge”. This is what Bauman (1995) calls endemic indeterminism. For Giddens 
(1990), this mode of life introduces trust for rational expert systems and unfamiliar 
persons for even the simplest of life tasks, on the one hand, and risk because “no matter 
how well a system is designed and no matter how efficient its operators, the 
consequences of its introduction and functioning, in the context of the operation of other 
systems and of human activity in general, cannot be wholly predicted” (Giddens, 1990: 
153), on the other hand 
According to Matanle (2011:103), modernity is being pushed by capitalism in order 
to reach its goal of a progressive and linear transformation of the human experience: 
As such its quality can most clearly be described as a transformative ethic that has as its 
engine pushing it forwards and outwards the positivistic and economistic rationalism that is 
capitalism. That is to say, with capitalism as its mechanism and its fuel, modernity seeks a 
progressive and linear transformation of the human experience into a rationally and 
reflexively ordered lifescape that can be proactively controlled and manipulated for the 
purposes of providing an ever more comfortable, fulfilling, liberating, challenging, and 
complex life for its human architects. 
The critics of modernity have described it variously. According to Best and Kellner 
(1991:112), Fredrick Nietzsche described modernity as an advanced state of decadence 
in which “higher types” are leveled by rationalism, liberalism, democracy, and 
socialism, and where instincts go into steep decline. Heidegger saw it as “the triumph of 
humanism” and a project of a rational domination of nature and human beings, the 
culmination of a process of “forgetting Being”. Deleuze and Guattari go farther when 
they describe it as oppressive territorialisation of desire into constrictive social 
structures and repressed personalities that nevertheless multiplies rhizomatic lines of 
escape (Best and Kellner, 1991). 
Taylor (1992:205) distinguishes between two theories of modernity. One is a 
“cultural” theory and another one an “acultural theory”. With the “cultural” theory of 
modernity, the transformations in the contemporary Atlantic world are seen as cultural 
of groups of closely related cultures, to be contrasted to all others, including their own 
predecessor civilization, but with a lot in common. With the “acultural” theory, on the 
other hand, the transformations of the contemporary Atlantic world are considered as 
culture-neutral operations. This implies that the transformations are not seen in terms of 
specific cultures, but rather seen as of a type which any traditional culture could 
undergo. A typical example is this way of looking at modernity as the growth of human 
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reason; another example would be seeing the transformations as if any and every culture 
can go through, and therefore which all will probably be forced to undergo. 
The distinction is quite important for this study for it analytically facilitates the 
clarification of what theoretical outlook of modernity is being used in this study has: 
Modernity is cultural; it is the western transformation that is being talked about, 
together with its universalizing character of self-imposition to other cultures. 
Modernity practices: Dissection and exploitation 
From the frame of modernity, certain ways of doing, reacting, and relating with things 
have evolved. These practices emanating from the modernity frame resulted into two 
main categories of dissection of nature and exploitation of nature. Francis Bacon (1561-
1626) is one of the pioneers of western modern scientific thought and its extension into 
technology for huge industrial and commercial explorations. In old western thought, 
however, there existed already thinkings that alienated nature. For example, already 
Aristotle, in his Politics, suggested a hierarchy: “… hence it is similarly clear that we 
must suppose that plants exist on account of animals … and the other animals for the 
sake of man…” (Gruen and Jameison, 1994:19). Even though Aristotle acknowledged 
this hierarchy, he tried to counterbalance it with the concept of natural teleology through 
establishing the intrinsic value of everything in nature: Everything had a purpose for 
existence.  
Why shouldn’t nature operate not for the sake of something or because a result is better? If 
then things occur either by coincidence or for the sake of something … therefore, among the 
things which occur and exist in nature, (they) are for the sake of something (Gruen and 
Jameison, 1994:19). 
Another example is the biblicalism of the Judeo-Christian tradition, deeply rooted in 
Western Europe, that suggested subjugation of nature with its Genesis 1:28: “...Rule 
over the fish of the sea and the birds of air and over every living creature that moves on 
the ground”. In this quote, the subjugation of the other-than-human-beings is implicit, 
even though some scholars have tried to mitigate the controversy by making a 
distinction between dominion and domination  (Al Gore, …, as cited by Gruen and 
Jameison, 1994:19) 
In his Novum Organum, Francis Bacon influenced the acceptance of accurate 
observation and experimentation in science. In it, he maintained that all prejudices and 
preconceived attitudes, which he called idols, must be abandoned, regardless of whether 
they were the common property of a people due to common modes of thought (idols of 
the tribe), or the peculiar possession of the individual (idols of the cave); and regardless 
of whether they arose from too great a dependence on language (idols of the 
marketplace), or from tradition (idols of the theatre). Much as Bacon’s ideas are 
biblically-charged, they are significant in the development of empiricism, as Jung 
(1991:7) comments: 
Bacon’s conception of philanthropia is an anthropocentrism pure and simple. For it is 
predicated upon man’s absolute knowledge and mastery of nature justified on the grounds of 
the biblical mandate. As the holy inquisition of nature leads to philanthropia, the Bible 
mandates that nature with “all her children” be bound and enslaved to serve man to achieve 
“the fructifying and begetting good for mankind”. 
Francis Bacon propagates the idea of the dissection of nature (experimentation) 
rather than the mediaeval scholastic abstractions of notions (speculation). For him, 
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nature should be bound into human service. It is in this bending of nature to human 
utility that nature loses its sacrality. While before Bacon, the relationship between 
human beings and nature was characterised by an I-thou ethic, which was in many times 
dominated by propitiation before any act of using the “thou”, Bacon’s transformation 
resulted into an I-Other ethic of legitimated domination of the “I” over the “Other”. 
According to Spedding et al. (1870:20???), 
The new man of science must not think that the inquisition of nature is in any part interdicted 
or forbidden. Nature must be bound into service and made a slave, put in constraint, and 
moulded by the mechanical arts. The searchers and spies of nature were to discover her plots 
and secrets. … Only by digging further and further in the mine of natural knowledge, could 
mankind discover that lost dominion (of nature). 
Merchant (1992:41-59) explains this phenomenon of transformation as a movement 
from an organic to a mechanistic worldview, with the interlude of the rise of capitalism. 
Bacon’s revolutionary thinking had serious effects on nature. The strong mechanistic 
worldview, which developed from his proposals to dominate nature through 
experimentation, welcomed more explorations on nature for human benefits. This 
mechanistic worldview (inspired by Descartes) set a strong foundation for the Industrial 
Revolution and cleared any animistic and/or organic assumptions about the cosmos. 
Another impact of Bacon’s revolution is the understanding of nature in terms of 
exploitation to serve human life. That is why Glanville (1958:9), following Bacon, 
commented that the basic objective of natural philosophy was to “enlarge knowledge by 
observation and experiment … so that nature being known, it may be mastered, 
managed, and used in the services of humane life.” 
Adam Smith (1723-1790), with his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, revolutionalised the economic thinking shifting it away from 
management to wealth generation, material welfare, and scarce resources. Before Smith, 
the concept of economics was limited to management. For example, the Greeks 
understood economics as science of household management. In many cases, generally, 
economics was understood as statecraft (because it coincided with political economy). 
For example, Arthashastra, an Indian term equivalent to economics, means statecraft. 
Montesquieu ascribes economic principles as pertaining to the particular form of 
government established in the country (Jhingan, 1975). This understanding of 
economics coincides with Aristotle’s first distinction of economics as oikonomike, that 
is, economics as provision of material needs of the household (Opio, 1993:11). After 
Smith, however, the conceptualisation of economics changed irrevocably. 
Smith’s understanding of economics was that one of treating the “nature and causes 
of wealth of nations and proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign (Jhingan, 
1975:1).” Robbins, in his Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 
defined economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses (Robbins, 1932:16).” Self-
interest, as suggested from the Wealth of Nations, became the centre of attention in 
economics. The following two passages are phenomenal exemplifications of the notion 
of self-interest. 
It s not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard of their interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but 
to their self-love … (Smith, 1759, as quoted by Raphael and Macfie, 1975:162) 
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In his Wealth of Nations, Smith (as quoted by Campbell, Skinner, Todd, 1976:2) 
advances the same idea by noting that: 
Every individual … neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how 
much he is promoting it …. By directing his industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of it. By pursuing 
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when 
he really intends to promote it. 
This concept of economics by Smith reflects the second categorisation of economics 
by Aristotle, the chrematistiké, that is, the art of enrichment (Opio 1993:11). Adam 
Smith’s thinking is none other than an economic Darwinism: The survival of the fittest 
in the economic race. 
Dissection of nature is a legacy of Francis Bacon through his Novum Organum that 
inspires the push towards “discovering the plots and secrets of nature” and the eventual 
mechanistic vision of reality. The exploitation of nature, instead, emphasizes the thrust 
to material welfare through competition because productive resources are scarce, 
pushed by self-interest for material welfare. The effect of both Francis Bacon and Adam 
Smith is the transformation of the conception of nature from the living and responsive 
nature to a dead and inert nature, manipulable and exploitable. 
Living animate nature died, while dead inanimate money was endowed with life. 
Increasingly, capital and the market assumed the organic attributes of growth, strength 
activity, pregnancy weakness, decay and collapse, obscuring and mystifying the new 
underlying social relations of production and reproduction that made economic growth and 
progress possible (Merchant, 1992:58). 
Thus, the practices that have emerged from Francis bacon and Adam Smith are 
responsible for an expedited exploitation of nature because nature has become 
mechanistic, on the one hand, and the attitudes, thinking, and practice towards nature 
have become functional for economic and material growth. This is simply a 
manifestation of an anthropocentrism which has remarkably been incarnated in the 
discourse of modernity through the frame of rationalism and the practices of dissection 
and exploitation of nature 
Modernity: The conveyors 
The question here is: How does modernity transform people? In a rather short article, 
Ninkaeng et al. (2011:32) argue that modernity is conveyed through the market 
economy, politics, and advanced society images; these are structures, which in turn, are 
able to change the daily lives of the people, their minds and mentality, and their socio-
economic circumstances. 
In general, the main stream of modernity emphasized market economy, politics, and 
advanced society. A majority of the … people approved of material wealth that came with 
modernity. The affluence of the material culture consequently motivated people for change in 
3 different ways. First, it created physical change by bringing modernity for use in daily life. 
Second, by experiencing with modernity, their mind or mentality had already gone ahead of 
their real lives. Finally, it was social and economic change that had emerged all along. 
Furlow (2005) adds two more important structures of education and religion in 
conveying modernity: 
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… European-style educational institutions opened and operated alongside of the religious 
educational system. These systems were mutually exclusive and in competition with one 
another with the religious schools providing basic education and religious training to the 
masses and government schools providing European-style education to the elite … A product 
of this dual system of education is a cultural rift between those who are more traditionally 
oriented and those who are more Euro-American oriented … (Furlow 2005:13) 
Structures interact. For example, it is through the education system and religion, 
which could be called the socialisation structures, that people are socialised with the 
structures of the market economy, politics, and images of advanced societies. At the 
same time the latter (market economy, politics, and images of advanced societies) shape 
the socialisation structures, trying to update them to the desired or aspired standards. 
Matanle (2011:103), speaks about institutions and organisations as conveyors of 
modernity: 
Mediating the mental and the material aspects of modernity are the institutions and 
organisations which individuals and groups construct in order that they might express their 
consciousness through the process of creative adaptation. In other words, institutions and 
organisations are the social mechanisms by which people not only create their environment 
out of the mental images they have developed but also are the method by which people 
accommodate themselves to the circumstances of their lives. For at the heart of modernity is 
the individual’s moral responsibility to discover his or her authentic inner consciousness and 
substantiate it in lived experience. 
In this debate about the conveyers of modernity, it is important to have a 
consideration on issues of technology. Rosemann (1999:21-22) paraphrasing 
Heidgegger argues how the latter has been a big critique of science and technology of 
modernity: 
The modern western way of apprehending the world transforms every object - and every 
subject - that could stand in the way of efficient ordering into a cog on the wheel of a system 
of productivity, which has become an end in itself. As a result of “enframing”, that is to say, 
the thought-form of modern western technology, a river becomes a reservoir of hydroelectric 
energy, a forest becomes a store for timber…, in a word, the whole of nature becomes a 
gigantic gasoline station. Even human beings are no longer seen as people, as subjects, but as 
potential consumers of fast food or as the material which fills the airplanes. As a 
consequence, it would be wrong to believe that a man is in charge of technology - 
technology is in charge of us. 
According to Zimmerman (1996:60), Heidegger’s thoughts on deep ecology was that  
humankind’s highest possibility and obligation is not to dominate nature through 
technological means, but rather to let things be in the twofold sense of allowing them to 
manifest themselves according to their own possibilities and of allowing them to pursue their 
own destinies with as little interference as possible.  
The manoeuvring of natural laws is for the sake of human beings at the expense of 
the rest of nature. Again, this is an anthropocentric manifestation with respect to science 
and technology.  
The institutions referred to are structures; an important element Matanle adds is the 
issue of agents: Organisations as agents to convey modernity. More still, Heidegger 
adds another element of science and technology. These are important observations 
because, then, it can be argued that agents, structures, science and technology convey 
modernity. 
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Modern environmental ecosophy 
In this sub-section, I try to argue that the effectiveness of the discourse of modernity can 
be seen in the reproduction of an exploitative ethos. Etymologically, the word ecosophy 
derives from two Greek words, eco and sophia. “Eco” derives from Greek oikos, 
meaning “house” or “home”. The home is about the organisms and groups of organisms 
found in nature and their interactions with one another and with their environment 
(Miller 1982); “it is about biological systems and communities” (Attfield 1998). For 
Pianca (1983:3) the home is about the biotic and abiotic (non-living environments 
where life forms, the interactions between and among them, and the totality of their 
relationships take place. “Sophia”, on the other hand, denotes insight or wisdom. So, 
ecosophy literally means “wisdom of household” or “household wisdom”. Naess 
(1989), the originator of the concept of ecosophy, argues that: 
an ecosophy becomes a philosophical world-view or system inspired by the conditions of life 
in the ecosphere. It should then be able to serve as an individual's philosophical grounding 
for an acceptance of the principles or platform of deep ecology. (Arne 1989:89) 
Of course, for Naess, as a deep ecologist, he does not see where humanity should go, 
other than getting to deep ecology. It is important to note this notion of ecosophy as 
worldview. According to Kearney (1984:1) a worldview is a “culturally organized 
macrothought: Those dynamically inter-related basic assumptions (i.e., presuppositions) 
of a people that determine much of their behavior and decision making, as well as 
organizing much of their body of symbolic creations... and ethnophilosophy”. A 
worldview, therefore, provides a foundation for thought, emotion, and behavior; a 
person is provided with presuppositions about what the world is really like and what 
constitutes valid and important knowledge about it (Cobern, 1994:5). The worldview 
lays foundation for what Van Den Born (2007) refers to as visions of nature, which, 
basically, comprises of three elements of 1) Values of nature: The reasons why nature is 
perceived to be important; 2) Images of nature: Wwhat people consider as nature and 
what types of nature they distinguish, and; 3) Images of relationship: What people hold 
as appropriate relation between humans and nature. 
In more abstract terms, Drengson and Inoue’s (1995:8) make an observation that 
ecosophy is a philosophy  
of ecological harmony or equilibrium. A philosophy as a kind of sofia (or) wisdom, is openly 
normative, it contains both norms, rules, postulates, value priority announcements and 
hypotheses concerning the state of affairs in our universe. Wisdom is policy wisdom, 
prescription, not only scientific description and prediction. The details of an ecosophy will 
show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only the ‘facts’ of 
pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value priorities (Drengson and Inoue, 1995:8). 
The difference between ecology and ecosophy, however, is crucial to be made here. 
Ecology has to do with the study of organisms in their home or a study of the home of 
organisms with everything that affects them there. While logos has specific scientific 
pretensions, sophia does not have such, but insights directly relevant for action. 
According to Naess (1989:37), sophia intimates acquaintance and understanding, rather 
than abstract results. In the same vein, Condit (2008:3) sees ecosophy as a personally 
dutiful, ecologically normative wisdom, which is the practical mode of ecology’s 
philosophical and normative dimensions. 
This dimension of practicality that is embedded in the notion of ecosophy calls for a 
dimension of ethos. In translating the word ethos from its etymological origin in Greek, 
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there are two meanings. It means “character”, on the one hand, and “habit”, on the other 
hand. The notion of character has the persuasive power of practice, than the persuasive 
power of values, which is found in the meaning of ethos as habit. This is the meaning 
that Aristotle refers to in his Rhetoric (Sullivan, 1953:1). 
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as 
to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than 
others: This is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact 
certainty is impossible and opinions are divided 
From this understanding, an ethos is, therefore, the distinguishing character, 
sentiment, or guiding beliefs of a person, group, or institution that pushes for practice. 
With the modern agents, structures, science and technologies an ecosophy with 
exploitative ecosophy has been created. This ecosophy characteristically manifests two 
ethos: Egocentrism and nos-centrism. The egocentric ethos is built on individualism 
whereby society should be organised on the basis of freedom of the individual from the 
institutional interference in the everyday conduct of one’s professional and private life, 
on the one hand, and where an individual’s excellence is determined by his/her capacity 
to compete, on the other hand. Thus, the egocentric ethos underlies impulses for an 
individual to think of being responsible for his/her own progress through his/her own 
struggle. For this matter, given the two assumptions of individualism and competition in 
the egocentric ethos, capitalism becomes a necessary and natural form of economic 
system: The collective behaviour of human groups or business corporations is not 
legitimate and the ecological effects are external to human economics and cannot be 
adjudicated (Merchant 1992:63-70). This is an ethos, therefore, which allows 
individuals to extract and use natural resources to enhance their own lives. 
If the egocentric ethos is based on an individual, the nos-centric ethos is grounded on 
collectivity. It is for the maximisation of the social good and the minimisation of the 
social evil, hence, the maximisation of the wanted and the minimisation of the 
unwanted. This ethos is today founded on utilitarianism. Utility, according to Bentham 
(1823:2-3), is a property in any object that tends to produce benefit, advantage, good, or 
happiness, or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness. The 
interest of the community is the sum total of the interests of the individuals in that 
community, and actions are good in as far as they tend to augment the happiness of the 
community. For Mill (1957:22-23), something good is related to the general interests of 
society, the interests of the whole and the good of the whole. Therefore, actions are right 
in proportion to their tendency to promote happiness or goodness in the society, and 
wrong in proportion to their tendency to produce the reverse of happiness. 
Due to utilitarian motivations, this ethos has permitted the undertaking of various 
projects, both big and small, with the rationale of greater good for a greater number of 
people. The intrinsic value of the exploited nature becomes subject to the instrumental 
value. Other values, especially those linked with the ecological system, are undermined. 
Parsons (1977:178) recalls that “in nature nothing takes place in isolation. Everything 
affects every other thing and vice versa.” This means that disruption of something in the 
ecological system means and leads to the disruption of something else in the very 
system. 
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Afterthought 
 
My philosophical stance 
I have grown up in a village, which was nearby a small town in the Northwest of 
Tanzania on the shores of Lake Victoria. Much as I remember to have gone to modern 
hospitals a number of times, always having a panic and trauma of seeing people in white 
(doctors and nurses), I remember to have taken so many times traditional herbs; I 
remember to have gone with my mother to collect them many times; I remember how 
she would show me a plant and tell me what it does in someone’s body; I remember 
how we would fence with small sticks particular plants in the banana plantation; I still 
remember the different kinds of plants which we would have nearby the house and 
others farther from the house. I remember some healing practices which I would take 
very serious: If I got a hick up, I would take a piece of banana leaf and place it on my 
forehead; hick-up was supposed to stop. I remember if I knocked of a tip of my toe, I 
would point the toe in a latrine and the toe would heal. 
Much as I remember to see my mother using kerosene to prepare food several times, 
I still remember that most of the times she used firewood to cook. I remember how I 
went to fetch firewood, the first day with my father and many days with my friends; I 
remember having learnt types of trees, some of them good for firewood, others god for 
construction, others good for medicine, others good for animals, others good for fruits 
and juices, others good for sticks for beating up people and animals, and others just to 
be left there in the bush or forest. 
Much as my village is on the shores of Lake Victoria, I was never allowed to go 
swimming. I was told how the lake was dangerous and would swallow me up, apart 
from having itches on my body. Given the taboo system, I, as a man of the Singo clan, 
am not supposed to eat fish; women of my clan can. I was also taught that given my 
clan, I am not supposed eat beef from a cattle with dots running from the nose to the 
tail; if I ate it, then the whole of my body swell or I could even die; I never saw a cow 
similar to that (but I am told such cows are there in areas with the Ankole cattle in 
Uganda and they are a totem to the Singo clan over there). 
In those days, around four decades back, this was my everyday encounter with nature 
with dos and donts. I was in this life and never made any serious though about whatever 
I was doing, how I was doing it, and the reasons I would do it. At some point, however, 
during my postgraduate studies, something popped up in my mind, triggered by a 
professor’s provocation that “man is to woman what human are to nature”. The 
professor was a gender activist. Her basic argument was that the way men relate to 
women is the same way humans relate to nature; the way men exercise power on 
women is the same way humans exercise power on other entities of nature. For me, this 
was a turning point to begin thinking a lot more on issues about the environment and 
gender, using power as an analytical tool. In fact, my master’s thesis, Rumours of 
Modernity, whispers of Postmodernism, hopes of Post-postmodernism: The search for 
sustainable environmental rehabilitation, was on environmental philosophy. I have had 
an opportunity to think more about the environment, or let me say, on nature as a whole, 
in a course that I teach at the university to postgraduate students: Environment and 
sustainable development. In this course where I introduce students to the different 
environmental challenges and to the structures that attempt to address such challenges, I 
have always remained with a question, which I delightedly share with my students: Why 
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is that when we try to trace ways to deal with environmental problems we always 
recycle the same failed ideas? I sometimes got an impression that my question was a 
wrong one, but I thought more that there was something wrong somewhere in my 
questioning, to the people I was giving the question, and the context in which I was 
giving the question. 
I have come to grips with my question and re-discovered myself through a certain 
way of understanding philosophy. For me, philosophy means being able to reflect on 
one’s experience, share it, and build up some wisdom for a good life, not only for 
oneself but for the entire universe. I think that philosophy has to inquire and theorise on 
what is taking place on the ground; philosophy has also to deal with the immediate, 
shaking our minds to make us re-think several times of the issues that we have 
sometimes, and quite often, taken for granted. It is a kind of human pilgrimage that 
necessitates a purification of the mind for a true metanoia. For any authentic 
development, particularly now when it is human-centered development, whereas 
development beyond humans is what is needed, philosophy becomes more important for 
any critical analysis of the status quo.  
The attitude with which reality should be faced is that one of learning from reality 
and not the other way round. The latter is tantamount to fixing reality to human’s own 
fixed paradigms. Surely, reality will be seen through human’s own spectacles, which are 
our own contextual accidents, but there is need to acknowledge that our own spectacles 
are simply a medium to watch reality; once, changed, even reality can be seen 
differently. It is here that philosophy calls for a revolutionary mind; and dealing with 
something that has to do with power relations, the revolution demands a more decided 
attitude. This is because one has to betray either his/her power-centre or someone else’s 
power-centre; both positions can carry with them unpleasant implications and 
consequences. If you belong to the power-centre questioned, then you become a traitor; 
and if you belong to another power-centre, you become a hopeless intruder. Either way, 
you are in trouble. Dealing with environmental issues requires one to run certain risks 
because there are high chances for the betrayal of where one belongs. This is because 
one of the biggest problems underlying the environmental crisis is the human-centred 
attitude. When one disqualifies this centredness, he/she is betraying his/her species. 
When one goes deeper and scratches the layers where “man” is responsible for the 
destruction of the environment, then this person risks becoming sexist. More 
problematic is even questioning the discourse in which we are living, the modern 
development discourse; if you are not branded traditional, then you should be weird in 
the time you are living because you seem to be biting the fingers that feed you. Who are 
you to question the modernizing development discourse? And why should you? And 
hence, an important question for philosophising: Should fear to be branded a traitor 
interfere with a felt obligation to point out the “ugly faces” of human beings? No, I do 
not think so! 
The uneasiness, however, is part of human growth, especially when we are faced 
with what challenges our status quo. Maintaining the current state of affairs is 
comfortable, but growth that demands change is uncomfortable; that is why it is 
undesirable. However, if humanity has to grow in rendering justice to itself and to by 
being in and with nature, two revolutions are necessary: The human centredness in the 
cosmos giving way to poly-centredness, and the “man-archy” in society giving way to 
“human-archy”. This consideration comes from a simple general observation: Human 
beings have messed up nature, and man has mismanaged society and nature. This shows 
 17 
how nature has basically suffered a double oppression: A general one from human 
beings and a specific one from man. But this is a difficult one. Let me express its 
difficulty using Tolstoy’s words, as quoted in Maggiore, (2000): 
I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can 
seldom accept even the simplest and most obvious truth if it would oblige them to admit the 
falsity of conclusions which they have delighted in explaining to colleagues, proudly taught 
to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabric of their lives”.  
Sometime back, I saw a cartoon in which a teacher asked a student: “After post-
industrialism, post-capitalism, post-structuralism, post-marxism, post-modernism, what 
next?” The student was smart enough to respond: “Post-early for exams!” I do not think 
that this should be the attitude with philosophising with regard to environmental 
challenges, an attitude that is about resting and getting contented with smart answers. 
Instead, the attitude should be one of seeking not peace in harbour but serenity in the 
storm.  
While working on this study, not only was I caught up in a methodological vacuum 
on which methodology to use to collect data and analyze it, but also in a theoretical 
vacuum of implicating modernity as problematic to the innocent traditional ways of 
dealing with the environment. In dealing with the two vacuums in this study, I realized 
that philosophizing is a never-ending experience; it is a free inquiry, always new and 
never completed (and especially very exciting!). Most of the time, I did not know on 
awakening to what extent I would have to modify this study that day; and once done, 
that was modification of my world picture before I went to bed that night.  
This kind of philosophizing, however, demands that one believes that there could be 
human limitations, but not limits because we never know whether we reached them; 
what is beyond, we cannot assimilate, yet its very invitation to us becomes part of our 
inner perspective. Thus, in this study, I feel that I am looking for ways to get liberated in 
and with nature. I feel I am like part of the old story where people have their eyes 
covered and they are being made to touch different parts of the elephant. When the first 
one touches the leg, he/she thinks it is a tree trunk; the second one touches the side and 
thinks it is a big leaf; and when the fourth one touches the tail, he/she shouts thinking 
he/she has touched a snake! This is a paradoxical experience of a philosophizing 
researcher until when he/she comes to realize that what he/she is experiencing is 
actually an elephant! 
About this study 
The paper does not aim at juxtaposing ‘traditional’ ecosophical positions and modernity 
positions, but rather showing that with the getting in of modernity, ecosophical 
positions have had evolutions leading to some ethos responsible for the current 
exploitative environmentalism. The study, again, does not aim at condemning any 
position and blessing another one, but rather pointing out to the fact that given the 
possibility of evolution in ecosophical positions, humans still have a chance to construct 
harmonizing ecosophical positions that would lead to sustainable co-existence of 
different members of the ecological community.  
This paper, thus, is critical in its optimism to counteract the pessimism that 
environmental rehabilitation is almost impossible. It helps to see that there is another 
possible opportunity through endeavours to differently construct our ecosophical 
positions. Social constructions can lead to better or worse ecosophical positions. This is 
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a premise that postulates the possibilities of socially constructing differently towards 
more harmonizing ecosophical positions that would lead to sustainable co-existence of 
different members of the ecological community. This is because human beings can put 
in motion processes to construct new ecosophies. This implies, therefore, putting to task 
the current dominant exploitative ethos, on the one hand, and disposition to be humble 
enough to acquire wisdom to change lifestyle, on the other hand. 
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